Categories
Did You Know?

What We Really Learned from Silicon Valley Bank

The Takeaways:

  1. Decentralized finance (DeFi) with smart self-regulations through technologies like blockchains, smart contracts & generative pre-trained transformer GPT inside each financial institute represents the future of efficient risk management.
  2. We can establish interest rates markets to allow different parties with different financial profiles and different needs to trade to their desires rates based on their needs, risk levels, time lengths, credit ratings, insurability, and expected returns from fund investment.
  3. FDIC should raise its coverage cap above $250,000 — partly paid by depositors with an excess amount — because uninsured deposits proved riskier this time than we assumed due to the self-fulfilling prophecy.

Not All Lessons Were Born Equal from SVB

Learning the right lesson is the key for the better future. There are so many potential lessons out there and everyone can and will have a different opinion on what to learn and how to prevent future crisis of financial institutions like banks.

Part of reason is that the case itself is very complicated, making it possible to have many things to say. If someone fell down from his bike, there is one or at most two lessons to learn: Either the road is too slippery or the rider was not focused. But when a bank with billions of dollars of asset fell, having only one or two lessons sounds like a failure in learning. It has to be more involved in it.

Not all lessons were born equal. For one thing, we must focus on risk management more than rescue scheme. The best that a rescue scheme can do is to arrive at a “no-loss + loss” result, while the best of risk management is to achieve a “win + win” for all parties.

Another relevant point is mindset more than demographics. For example, a lesson that I have heard many talking about is to attract a diverse pool of clients and avoiding over-exposure to any single sector, single industry or single type of clients. This is always true and always makes sense. However, I do believe we can do things without for an ideal client base. After all, having a special type of clients is not always a bad thing. For one thing, they allow us to develop the best resources for serving a unique group of people, rather than serving everybody. Imagine such a boring landscape picture, in which all banks have the same customers. I would rather see a more diversified picture in which banks are proud of their unique clients.

It’s an open secret that regional banks always face a bigger challenge in attracting diversified clients than national banks. The way the former compete with the latter is not in size and types of clients but in doing one or two things better than the latter.

Ultimately, the key is not about client type but always about risk management. A good risk management strategy starts with, and grow on, the existing clients, not betting on changing them.

With SVB clients, we can learn to (1) know the existing clients well, especially their demand liquidity; (2) do periodical stress tests and (3) possessing bond funds and/or bond ETF. All these can be done without waiting for a safer diverse client base to come by.

A Deeper & Bigger Lesson

If there is one forward looking lesson out of all lessons, if we must say something fundamentally important, it is this: Stop trusting central human regulators and switch tech enabled decentralized smart regulations, where the word “tech” refers not only to FinTech but all the new technologies in and out of financial world.

We can start from the recent report on Fed’s San Francisco branch that missed the red flag of SVB. More generally, the time of central bank intervention determines everything. Regulators need to allow a time cushion following a quick turn of monetary policy. For example, banks with maturity mismatch should have access to funds to keep liquidity and to avoid “fire sale” of their portfolio with huge losses.

But it is always easier said than done with the current system. We have witnessed the modern bank run this time but there is no guarantee that it will not happen again. Humans are not always smart learners and we do have a tendency of repeating the same mistakes over time. In my last post, I highlighted two lessons from SVB: interest risk and liquidity risk. We have been talking about them since day one in financial world, and yet we are still struggling with them decades later.

How do we truly make progress in financial risk management from now on for the future?

The first thing I want to say is this: Although one of the direct casualties this time was the Signature Bank with strong crypto link, the message that carried by the dead messenger is more relevant than ever: The future lies in decentralized and proactive “smart regulations” that assist each bank, including those led by “zombie leaders” like in the case of SVB whose only strength is to guard self-interest but little else (尸位素餐), to constantly monitor current and future risks.

“Smart” More Than “Decentralized” Regulations

The name “decentralized” may sound exclusive rather than inclusive. In my mind “smart regulations” will reserve a big seat for central banks instead of eliminating them. The SVB case tells us that sometimes only words and resources possessed by central authorities would work, and does so dramatically.  

Here is another example from the insurance industry. According to this commentary of AM Best, the largest credit rating agency in the world for the insurance industry, that had the U.S. government not stepped in to make all depositors whole, underwriters of directors and officers insurance for startups and venture capitalists, as well as the financial institution insureds supporting such entities, could have faced financial distress given that they are operating on very thin capital.

This is because “’startups are by nature much more agile and less risk-averse than other companies, their directors and officers often make decisions quickly,’ said David Blades, associate director, industry research and analytics, AM Best. ‘Therefore, the potential for D&O claims for startups would have been high in the case government had decided not to help the depositors.’”

There will be lawsuits for sure no matter what. According to this report of AP, “A class action lawsuit is being filed against the parent company of Silicon Valley Bank, its CEO and its chief financial officer, saying that company didn’t disclose the risks that future interest rate increases would have on its business.”

“It is looking for unspecified damages to be awarded to those who invested in SVB between June 16, 2021 and March 10, 2023.

“In particular, the lawsuit said that annual reports for 2020 through 2022, “understated the risks posed to the company by not disclosing that likely interest rate hikes, as outlined by the Fed, had the potential to cause irrevocable damage to the company,” the lawsuit stated.”

“It also claims that the company “failed to disclose that, if its investments were negatively affected by rising interest rates, it was particularly susceptible to a bank run.”

With the above being said, let’s go back to remedies and we can do two big things toward smart regulation.

Decentralized, Flexible FDIC Caps

We have already seen solutions include raising FDIC insurance coverage cap above the current $250,000 line. Lawmakers all seem to be open on this idea, with the focus on how much the new cap should be.

This is a good idea because we have learned this time that non-FDIC insured deposits can post a big risk. It directly triggered the bank run of SVB, and explains why the share price for the First Republic Bank has been down by 70%. Uninsured deposits prove riskier this time than we assumed due to the self-fulfilling prophecy.

However, unlike the old cap of $250k, this time we probably do not want to have a fixed, nationwide new cap of FDIC coverage. Instead, we want FDIC’s new coverage cap determined through a negotiation process by individuals, and to be paid partly by depositors with an excess amount, sort of like copayments in the healthcare business. This way, depositors will share the responsibility and will be given personalized choices in determining how much risk they want to take.

The range of caps can go from 100% to 0% theoretically, and it’s up to the depositors to decide. Those who choose 0% extra coverage can always take advantage of the existing cap of $250k by having multiple accounts across financial institutions for excessive amount of money, not leaving all eggs in a single basket.

Depositors can either spread fund across banks or using Certificate of Deposit Account Registry Service CDARS, opening a cash management account, relying on MaxSafe by Wintrust or finally using Depositors Insurance Fund (DIF).

Either way, each depositor will sign a legally binding contract with FDIC and the bank where they deposit their money, stating that they fully understand the risk and in case of bankruptcy, only the amount they have purchased will be covered by the program.

Establishing National and Regional Interest Rates Markets

This is a bigger deal and of course will be subject to discussions and debates. But the basic idea is simple and interest rate swaps already exist and are an important component of the fixed-income market according to a Smartasset.com article. We just need to expand it to make market interest rate floating rather than fixed and to allow variation

The first thing about interest rate swap is that they are financial derivatives traded over the counter, where investors will typically exchange a fixed-interest payment for a floating-rate interest payment, which is known as vanilla swaps. Investors use these contracts to hedge or to manage their risk exposure.

But we do more than vanilla swaps, including allowing parties with different needs and profiles to trade directly among themselves.

The basic driver of an interest rate market or markets is different needs and different financial profiles of different parties. On the profile side, entities with low credit rating are willing to offer higher interest rates to attract buyers of their products, while the opposite holds true for the high credit rating entities.

The other profiling factor is time of economy. During a booming economy, parties don’t mind paying a higher interest rate because their returns from the fund are expected to be higher. On the other hand, when a future project does not have big expected return the owner of the project is only willing to pay lower rated fund. To the extent that a region is growing fast, many investment projects can expect high return, which push up a higher interest rate in that region.

At the end, we just need to calculate the average bidding interest rate in a region to come up with a region specific & time specific interest rate as the “going rate” for all.

On the need side, some entities are willing to pay a higher interest rate when getting funds quickly matters more than higher interest rates. Other entities do not have any urgent need for fund and will only pay low rated funds. The average of the ongoing highest price a fund buyer (the bid price) is willing to pay will be the “going bidding rate” of interest. The average of the ongoing lowest price fund sellers (the ask price) are willing to accept will be the “going asking rate” of interest. The average of the going bidding interest and going asking interest will be the market going interest rate.

The idea is to replace the single nationwide interest rate set by central banks to a diversified and decentralized, market determined interest rates, in which central banks can still set basic rates but anything beyond is subject to market forces.

Categories
Did You Know?

Silicon Valley Bank: New Casualty, Old Causes

The Takeaways:

  1. Bank runs are still possible today because although we have learned to tighten centralized financial regulations, we are still weak in financial risk management that proactively predict risk and take preemptive steps — even for highly predictable and familiar risks.
  2. We have seen textbook examples of (1) how interest risk grows to a bank run through the well-known inverse relationship between bond price and (2) how liquidity risk from duration mismatch exacerbated by dramatic change in interest rate has created enough momentum to kill a solvent bank.

Silicon Valley Bank: The Good Beginning Story

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB, NASDAQ symbol SIVB) is not exactly a household name even in northern California where the bank is located (in Santa Clara County, one of the nine counties in the San Francisco Bay Area.) Frankly, I heard the 6 season comedy TV Series “Silicon Valley” since 2014 but don’t recall the bank’s name on top of my head, even though it is the 16th-largest lender in America, with about $200 billion in assets.

According to this article by Seeking Alpha, “ from 2019 to late 2022, SIVB total deposits more than tripled, growing from $61.7 billion in 2019 to $173 billion as of December 2022.”

A great story, right? Sure it is or was. But then comes the bad one. It all started from what the bank did with the deposited money. Normally this is not a problem, because most of the time most banks will lend the money out to individuals and businesses who can make a better use of the money than the depositors can, and earn a higher interest than they pay to the depositors.

This is what most banks do for living, among other activities.

For example, say SVB received a total deposit of $1 million from a startup firm called NuLife in Santa Clara County. SVB pays NuLife $20,000 (2% of the $1 million) in interest for putting their money in the bank, while keeps the rest of $980,000 in its account. The bank will not let the money sit there collecting dust but will lend it to another business called OldBuz at 5% interest, which is $980,000 x 0.05 = $49,000. In so doing SVB will earn a net amount of $49,000 – $20,000 = $29,000.

Earning a higher interest rate from the loan recipients than the interest rate banks pays to the depositors, this is the basic business model and SVB is not different from others. The only difference is that it did better than many others by attracting more depositors, especially tech startups and venture capital firms.

The Pandemic Shocks & the Changed Course of Government

Then the pandemic changed everything. I agree with this article of Business Insider that the SVB fallout “was a byproduct of the Federal Reserve’s hiking of interest rates by 1,700% in less than a year.”

But to fully understand the impact of the quick change of course by Fed, we must understand how much Fed had done during the pandemic, or how hard the Fed worked to make sure all lenders and borrowers can have easy access to money.

This paper of the Brookings Institute summarized the key changes by the Fed during the pandemic months, which has been credited with staving off an economic crisis and bolstering financial markets at a time when there was a “sharp contraction and deep uncertainty about the course of the virus and economy sparked a “dash for cash” — a desire to hold deposits and only the most liquid assets — that disrupted financial markets and threatened to make a dire situation much worse.”

First of all, the Fed purchased large quantities of government bonds and other securities, famously known as Quantitative Easing or QE, to make it easier for individuals and businesses to access credit, to stabilize financial markets and to support economic activity.

The Full Package of Stimulus from the Pandemic Era

The pandemic stimulus is not a single step but a full package of multiple programs, spanning not just monetary but fiscal steps. Let’s begin with the four (new and renewed) programs to promote financial liquidity for banks:

  1. Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF), a program introduced in March 2020 to provide liquidity to money market mutual funds (MMFs), which are investment in short-term, low-risk securities like commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and Treasury bills. Fed lent money to eligible MMFs at a low interest rate in exchange for collateral in the form of high-quality assets, such as Treasury securities and agency debt.
  2. The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), a lending program introduced in March 2020 to provide short-term funding to primary dealers, which are firms that have a trading relationship with the Federal Reserve and participate in the buying and selling of government securities, such as Treasury bonds and bills. These firms, which include SVB since 2015, are considered essential to the functioning of the financial system. Under PDCF, primary dealers can borrow funds from the Fed for a period of up to 90 days, using a variety of eligible collateral such as Treasury securities, agency debt, and mortgage-backed securities. The interest rate charged on these loans is set by the Fed and is typically lower than market rates.
  3. Direct lending to banks with a lowered rate by 2 percentage points (from 2.25% to 0.25%). It’s said that eight big banks agreed to borrow from the discount window in March 2020, just so that other banks won’t feel bad and fear that markets and others will think they are in trouble.
  4. Temporarily relaxing regulatory requirements to encourage banks to use their regulatory capital and liquidity buffers to increase lending during the pandemic.

The above are not the only game in town, as the Fed had other things in mind. Turned out that the liquidity it added to the shocked economy covered corporation (through the Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility or PMCCF, Commercial Paper Funding Facility or CPFF, Supporting loans to small- and mid-sized businesses, Supporting loans to non-profit institutions), households and consumers (through Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility or TALF) and state and municipal borrowing (through Direct lending to state and municipal governments, Supporting municipal bond liquidity).

The following answer from Perplexity.ai, which integrates current web search results into the GPT (Generative Pre-training Transformer) process, tells us more about the fiscal stimulus on top of the monetary policy changes:

“The US government implemented both fiscal and monetary stimulus measures to mitigate the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Fiscal stimulus measures included direct payments to individuals, paycheck protection, student loan forbearance, eviction and foreclosure moratoriums. The economic impact of the pandemic sent the US economy into a recession in February 2020, with unemployment rates rising as high as 14.7% in April 2020.The direct payments to individuals were referred to as “economic impact payment” checks amounting to up to $1,200 per eligible adult.

“There were three rounds of such checks, including additional payments of up to $600 and $1,400 per person in 2021. The size and scope of these direct checks was a new experiment for the US government.

“The Federal Reserve Bank estimated that US fiscal stimulus during the pandemic contributed to an increase in inflation. However, economists largely agree that the money helped local governments shoulder significant pandemic-related costs and many governments avoided deep budget cuts. Many states have even reported surpluses.”

Here we have it: a teamwork of government branches toward the same goal of avoiding pandemic induced recession.

The Insightful Warning

Installing stimulus is one thing, foreseeing its full consequences is another. It is the latter that is the key for risk management. For that we must thank the former U.S. Treasury Secretary Lawrence H. Summers, who was the first to point out the danger of inflation following fiscal and monetary stimulus during the pandemic. The following answer from Perplexity.ai tells us that “In February 2021, he warned that additional government stimulus efforts to combat a pandemic slowdown raised the risk of inflation. He has since sent several warnings to Washington urging them to tap the brakes on stimulus or risk unleashing a serious burst of inflation.” Not only that, but Summers disagrees with the common belief that inflation is transitional as points out by this article of Barrons.com. “He was right: Consumer prices rose 8.6% year over year in May, the fastest pace in 40 years.”

Coordinated Stimuli Require Coordinated Risk Management

I agree with this article by Business Insider that cites Lundy Wright, partner at Weiss Multi-Strategy Advisers, that “(w)hen you raise interest rates quickly, after 15 years of overstimulating the economy with near-zero rates, to not imagine that there’s not leverage in every pocket of society that will be stressed is a naive imagining.”

Wright used a “double negative” sentence that is not the easiest to understand. His message is simply that we should expect some passengers to fall off of the bus when the driver made a sharp turn without reducing the speed.

Once again, much attention has been given to Fed’s monetary policy but not enough to the fiscal side, at a time when coordinated risk management is called for.

The aforementioned article of Business Insider points out that Fed’s “prolonged period of low interest rates created many financial dislocations that are now flaring up.”

In the SVB case, the “dislocations” came from two familiar places. The first is interest risk showing as the inverse relationship between interest rate and bond prices; the second is liquidity risk as maturity mismatch between long term asset holdings and short term liability demands. The SVB management has done a lousy job in handling both risks. These when combined with the startups’ high liquidity demand, led to the collapse of SVB.

The First Dislocation After QE: Interest Risk

Let’s begin from the inverse relation between interest rate and bond price. I’ll simply call it interest risk because what drives the inverse relation is the changed interest rate.

Long story short: The pandemic QE made it hard for banks to earn high interest income from writing loans to businesses and individuals. This is because when money is everywhere available, charging a high interest for bank loans is a mission impossible, it only drive customers to your competitors.  

So here is the problem: SVB was sitting on a big pile of deposited money and must find a place to keep it safely and profitably. SVC chose to park its money in treasury bonds, which is known as “risk free” because they are backed up by federal government tax revenues so there is no need to worry about default, meaning no need to worry about the bond issuers (the Treasury Department) to go bankrupted without paying off their debts to bond buyers or investors.

Of course, hardly anything under the sun is entirely risk free. Although the Treasury Bond (or “T-Bond” as it is often called, or simply “Treasuries”) itself is very safe, it does have a time related problem, where T-Bonds fight with each other to turn it into a risky game.

To illustrate, let’s think of a car dealership selling both used cars and new cars. The Treasury department is a new car dealership and only sells newly issued T-bond to investors. Bond buyers however don’t have to keep their bonds until maturity, just like car buyers don’t have to keep the same cars until they are no longer functioning. Bond buyers can sell their bonds before maturity just like a car buyers can sell his used car before it is dead — in a secondary market.

But here is where a risk free product becomes risky: In the secondary market where bond owners trade among themselves like used car owners do to their second or third hand cars, the price is not guaranteed. Some “used” T-bonds can sell a high price while others low, just like “hot” and not so hot brands of used cars.

One thing different in the used car market is that the price is almost entirely determined by the age of the car. A 1998 Civic will be sold cheaper than a 2011 Civic, other things equal. Another thing that is almost certainty is that nobody will ask a price higher than his original purchasing price — unless the car belongs to some rare classic models.

Unlike used cars, the old T-Bond can be resold in the secondary market either above or below the original purchase price. The age of bond has little impact on the resale price, only the difference between new and old interest rates.

Yes, in the bond game interest is the king, almost nothing else matters as much. Most people expect that the principal will be returned at the end of the maturity date, so This is so because people buy bond for the one reason of receiving interest payments, much like people buy car for driving. Buying bond is lending your cash to the bond issuer, who must pay interest to entice bond buyers.

Imagine someone wants to borrow $1,000 from you. Your first response is “Why would I lend you the money? I don’t even know you.” Well, the shortest — but convincing — answer from the stranger will be “I’ll pay you interest every month before I return your $1,000 in two years.” For most people, that’s a reason good enough.

Back to the old or secondary bond market, the key question buyers ask sellers is not how old the bond is, like in the used car market, but “what interest did you (or do I) get?” The reason is simple, if the seller gets 2% interest, that’s the rate the buyer in the secondary market will get after buying.

Here is the question: If the newly issued bond is paying 3% interest, why would anyone buy the “used bond” that only pays 2%? The only reason for a rational buyer is when the used bond (paying 2% interest) is offered at a lower price than the seller paid before. This is where an inverse relation between current interest rate and bond price comes into play.

This is similar to selling your old, gas inefficient car today at a lower price because buyers have more gas efficient new cars to buy from someone else in the new cars market.

SVB got itself into such a troubled situation as the bond seller: The bank needed to sell bonds for quick cash to pay depositors, but the only way for anyone to buy the bond is when SVB lowers the bond selling price. Every transaction when the bond changed hands means a loss for SVB.

The Second Dislocation After QE: Liquidity Risk

Liquidity risk, in its simplest term, means you are out of cash when you need them the most. It differs from poverty, which means no money anywhere in any form, people facing liquidity problem have money but in the wrong form or wrong places other than cash.  

SVB got itself into a liquidity trouble because it invested heavily into mortgage backed securities (or MBS for short), in addition to Treasuries.

For those not familiar with MBS, starting from mortgage loans would help. Strictly speaking, a mortgage is a loan, so you don’t have to say, “mortgage loan,” just “mortgage” is fine. Mortgage is a loan specifically for buying a home or property. Of course, lenders are not charities and then offer mortgage because they will receive interest payment from homebuyers.

When you take out a mortgage, you agree to pay back the money you’ve borrowed (called “principal”), plus interest, over a set period of time like 15-30 years, in addition to taxes and insurance. If the borrower fails to make payments on their mortgage loan, lenders have the legal right to take the home (or commercial property) back and put them in the market for sale through a foreclosure auction.

Generally speaking, mortgages that last anywhere at or above 10 years are long term loans. Most mortgages are therefore long term loans. The other feature is that individual mortgages are not considered securities because they have little risk — lenders can always take back the properties from borrowers, called collateral, for failure to make loan payments. Finally, a mortgage cannot be traded in the market because it is not an investment vehicle but a loan involving two parties: borrower & lender.

The story with MBS is different. First, it is created when banks issue mortgages to homebuyers and then pack or bundle up many mortgages and sell the package to a group of investors. As such, MBS is always an investment product bought and sold through a broker by investors, which include individual investors, corporations, and institutional investors on a secondary market.  

MBS is designed to free up the capital of the original mortgage lenders, often banks, credit unions and other financial institutions, so they can lend to more potential homeowners by leveraging investors who want to have a low risk investment at a discounted price.  

Secondly, most mortgages in the US are securitized, meaning they exist in the form of MBS that is traded in the markets for profit. Thirdly, most MBSs are issued by government-sponsored enterprises such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae that buy mortgage loans. Fourth, they are considered relatively low-risk investments especially if an MBS is guaranteed by the federal government, investors do not have to absorb the costs of a borrower’s default.

That said, an MBS is only as safe as the mortgages that back it up. During the subprime mortgage meltdown of 2007-2008, many MBSs were vastly overvalued due to non-payments. More generally, interest rate risk always exists with MBSs, as its price can drop when interest rates rise — just like the Treasuries (remember the discussion we had earlier?) In many ways MBSs are like bonds, both are fixed-income securities that pay a set amount of interest over time.

Interest risk explains “reinvestment risk” because when interest rate is low, borrowers want to refinance to take advantage of the lower interest rate. Let me illustrate with a hypothetic example.

Imagine you are currently paying off a fixed-rate mortgage with a 30-year loan term at 6% interest rate. Now, say the current interest rate is only 4%. You decide to refinance, which means to take out a new loan to pay off an existing mortgage. 

To make it easier to understand, say you have two investor friends, Fred and Sam. You met Fred first when the prevailing interest rate is 5%. Fred offered you $2,000 at 5% interest a year for two years, you thought you did not have choice, so you agreed. One year later you met Sam when the prevailing interest rate is 3%. After hearing your story with Fred, Sam says he’d be happy to lend you $2,000 for two years at only 3% interest.

Guess what you will do? You will borrow $2,000 from Sam and give it to Fred right away, telling him the deal is over as you find a lower interest to pay — assuming you’ve already paid $100 interest (5% of $2,000) to Fred for the last year. This is refinance and you saved yourself $80 because instead of paying $200 in two years to Fred, you only pay $120 to Sam in two years (3% of $2,000).

Fred now has a “reinvestment” problem because his money (a loan) was prepaid by you so he must find another borrower to lend the money to. Knowing Sam’s is willing to go as low as 3%, Fred will have to go down with the lower interest rate.

In addition to interest risk, credit and default risk is also associated with MBSs. This is straightforward: investors will experience losses if borrowers fail to make their interest and principal payments. Importantly, MBS investors are not the owner of the mortgage, so if a borrower defaults, not only the investor’s income will be interrupted but they do not claim any proceeds from foreclosure sales.

The Macroeconomic Risk of MBS: Negative Convexity

Interest risk, reinvestment risk and credit and default risk are all real but in the case of SVB, the macroeconomic risk associated with MBS is negative convexity.

First of all, convexity means curving outward—like the shape of the outside of a contact lens. The opposite is concavity, which means curving inward—like the shape of the inside of a contact lens. Put differently, a concave shape can be “filled,” while a convex shape creates a dome.

In our context, to understand convexity we need to understand duration first, which measures how sensitive bond price is to changes in interest rates. For example, if a bond duration is 3, it means when interest rate increases by 1%, bond price will decrease by 3%.

There are two contributing factors: time to maturity and coupon rate. The longer time before bond or MBS maturity, the higher the duration. This is easy to understand: If you lent money to someone and the borrower will pay you back tomorrow, you don’t care much about interest rate change because the loan has the “time to maturity” of just one day. Now, if you loan money to someone for 20 years, then interest change matters much more to you because your interest risk is higher over a longer period.

Similarly, the larger the coupon rate, the lower the duration, because a part of money has been paid back through coupons, which is just another name for “annual interest.” In an extreme case, we have bonds that are zero coupon bonds, meaning do not pay any coupon or annual interest at all until it’s maturity date, then duration is equal to time to maturity.

Now, convexity is measuring the rate of duration changes. Turns out duration is an approximation of the change in bond price in response to interest rate changes. For small changes in interest rate, it is accurate but not for larger ones as it always overestimates the price change if interest rates rise a lot, like the situation we are seeing today. Convexity helps correct this overestimation and provide a more accurate estimate of how much a bond’s price will change given a certain change in interest rate (or “yield” as commonly called).

With negative convexity, when the interest rate increases (like we are seeing today), the price of a negatively convex bond will fall by a greater rate. This does not hold for the opposite case when interest rates decrease. In other words, bond or MBS price is more sensitive to a rate increase than a rate decrease. A rate increase (like we see today with inflation) poses a bigger risk on bond price than a rate decrease. This makes negative convexity a bigger issue for SVB this time.

Callable bonds and mortgage-backed securities are examples of negatively convex bonds.

Categories
Cryptocurrencies & NFTs

CBDC By All Means

For those paying even limited attention to the news, it is almost impossible to finish a day without hearing words like “Cryptocurrencies,” “NFTs (Non-Fungible Tokens)” and “CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency),” especially after the Super Bowl 2022. The best question to ask at this point is not whether crypto will stay and grow, but how to deal with changes in currency — something that has not happened for decades or a century — to make the transition more smoothly, costing less and gaining more.

CBDC = Authoritarianism?

Some commentators, like this opinion piece by Aubrey Strobel, went out of their ways to argue that we should avoid CBDC by all means because it symbolizes authoritarianism. If the US adopts CBDC, it “will be the end of American freedom” according to Strobel, and “the American government will be on a surefire path to authoritarianism.” “CBDCs would create an authoritarian surveillance state and constitute a severe overreach of power.”

Strobel is not alone, and she has companies in the US Congress. For convenience I will only cite the words from Congressman Tom Emmer (R-MN), which were cited in this Harvard Business Review article, “Central banks increase control over money issuance and gain insight into how people spend their money but deprive users of their privacy.” Other politicians may say similar things.

What are the problems with this way of thinking?

Two in my view: It ignores or at least underestimates the power of rule of law, and it jumps to conclusions prematurely. I will discuss each below in turn.

Keeping Rule of Law in Mind

There are “China haters” who would criticize anything and everything China does and would push the US away from doing anything remotely similar to what China is doing or has done. But they forget — ironically for lawmakers — that the key difference between China and the US is rule of law: The latter has it, but the former has not.

Under the current leadership of Xi Jinping, China clearly shows more interests in “rule of party” than rule of law. It would be a shameful waste if the US follows a strategy of eschewing anything China does, because the US has long existing and detailed laws to protect citizens’ privacy, while China can only resort to its top leaders’ goodwill or personal preferences.

To be sure, China has come from a long way behind and has made long strides of progresses. There is no better way to summarize the situation than simply saying that time has changed. Even the top leaders can no longer do what their processors could do. If China shifts from Xi Jinping to “Wang Jinping” or “Li Jinping,” whoever takes the helms today is unlikely to go back to Mao’s era completely.

As a good example, just when seemingly everyone in the US or EU is accusing China as a surveillance state, even with a model to link surveillance cameras with internal citizen control to turn everyone into his own policeman. Few has bothered to mention the fact that “(r)oughly 770 million surveillance cameras are in use today, and that number is expected to jump to one billion by 2021, according to a market forecast reported by the Wall Street Journal last year.

China has also moved toward guarding citizens’ privacy. According to the BIS (Bank of International Settlement) 2021 report, which cites different approaches taken by countries to protect citizens’ privacy, China’s version of CBDC, called e-CNY, “is to shield the identity of the user by designating the user’s public key, which is issued by the mobile phone operator, as the digital ID. The central bank would not have access to the underlying personal details.”

Yet China still has a long way to go, and the strong legal guardrail preventing power abuse, like the system we see in the US, is simply not there. Missing that, Chinese citizens can still only count on the goodwill of top leaders and little else. This is likely to be the key and long lasting advantage the US has over China.

Sometimes I get angry after repeatedly seeing public events taking (the usual) bad turns in China, where governments have the knee-jerk reactions case after case: blocking the news from spreading instead of addressing the root of the problems. Take a look at this latest example of a trafficked woman who was chained to a small shed after producing eight children. What the ABC News report did not mention is that local governments, while promising to conduct a thorough investigation and “detained six people and fired eight lower-level Communist Party officials,” are also investigating who gave the pictures to the media that caused a big fuss on the domestic Internet. These are exactly the kind of developments that kills my confidence in China’s system — the same confidence that Xi Jinping told the world to have with China.  

“Have faith in your own institutions. Know your competitors but first, know yourself better.” These are the words I want to say to some Americans.

Tactic vs. Strategic Institutions

It is important to remember that CBDC is not an institution standing by itself, separating from everything else. CBDC is not falling from the sky and randomly landing itself anywhere in the world, either. It is not CBDC that creates authoritarianism, just like it is not Bitcoin that will turn a country into democracy. CBDC and Bitcoin are what I call “tactical institutions.” It is the bigger, higher level — the “strategic institution” of rule of law — or lack thereof, that controls the nature of CBDC.

The BIS 2021 report, my favorite document on the CBDC topic, says it well: “The same technology that can encourage a virtuous circle of greater access, lower costs and better services might equally induce a vicious circle of data silos, market power and anti-competitive practices.” Furthermore, “whether a jurisdiction chooses to introduce CBDCs, FPS or other systems will depend on the efficiency of their legacy payment systems, economic development, legal frameworks and user preferences, as well as their aims.”

Rule of Law Brings Surprises

One way to understand and to remember what rule of law is about is to think of it as capable of bringing “surprises.” Without rule of law, those who are stronger and more resourceful would “logically” dominate those weaker and less resourceful. Without rule of law, those who have free access to precious information would “naturally” use it anyway they see fit with little consequence. Without rule of law, those at a higher hierarchical position would “normally” smash or abuse those below anyway pleases them and expect little repercussion.

But rule of law changes all that, and there is very little left to be taken for granted with rule of law. Think you can ­dominate the less powerful others? Think again! Think you can use all the information you have access to? Sorry but think again! Think you can wield all your positional power on your subordinates, once again it would be smarter to think again!

Why are those “surprises” good for the society? Because (1) they send a signal out that justice is possible; (2) they bring at least some power to the presumably powerless; (3) they turn the world into a more level playing field than other models of social governance where rule of law is missing or weakening; (4) they prevent “winner takes all” from happening, at least from happening all the time; and (5) they redefine strength and weakness not by a single type of resource but multiple types.

Simply put, the biggest advantage of rule of law is to organize and mobilize social resources, public or private, by transparent, carefully designed and universally applied rules. Xi Jinping of China does not believe it and is trying to revive the legacy “rule of men” system. He is wasting time — his and China’s. The best test of rule of law is how many surprises like those listed above an average citizen will encounter on an average day. Until China someday proves itself capable of producing more surprises, China is still a weak country no matter how big its GDP figures are.

Don’t get me wrong: Rule of law will not be completely watertight or completely bulletproof but acts like human immune system: the most efficient, adaptive and holistic first line of defense.

In the case of CBDC, rule of law changes the question to be asked: It is not whether central banks have direct access to citizens’ private information or not, but what they can do about it and what consequence they must face in case of abuse, that separates authoritarianism and democracy.

Of course, we can design the CBDC model such that central banks do not always or do not automatically have direct access to citizens’ transactions data. I will come to that point later.

Is Nakamoto Too Radical?

I know there are many enthusiasts out there who would accept nothing but Satoshi Nakamoto and his Bitcoin. With all due respect for the pioneer, Nakamoto has shown a tendency to forget or to underestimate the power of rule of law. He designed Bitcoin in a way like it was in the wild and lawless west. As a result, Nakamoto and his Bitcoin bring truly radical changes.

A good framework of evaluation is to consider the three dimensions of an information system: architecture (concentrated or distributed), access (permissionless or permissioned) and control (centralized or decentralized) as discussed in this insightful essay.

Nakamoto goes all the way to change all three dimensions at the same time by making Bitcoin a distributed ledger (i.e., financial bookkeeping records distributed over numerous public nodes with redundant copies), with completely open (i.e., “permissionless”) access and entirely decentralized control. His design came at the time when we had an entirely concentrated, permissioned and centralized monetary system. Bitcoin was consciously made as the anti-thesis of the status quo.

When someone tries to do too much at a single shot, the solution is inevitably radical rather than balanced. This does not mean the proposal will be a total failure. Consider Warren Buffett who used to call Bitcoin “rat poison” years ago, but just invested $1 billion to a cryptocurrency friendly bank, Nubank based in Brazil. It is safe to say that Bitcoin is here to stay.

However, radical solutions tend to have an excessive cost. As the BIS (Bank for International Settlement) 2021 report points out, “it is clear that cryptocurrencies are speculative assets rather than money, and in many cases are used to facilitate money laundering, ransomware attacks and other financial crimes. Bitcoin in particular has few redeeming public interest attributes when also considering its wasteful energy footprint.

Even Bitcoin fans or early adapters have voted by feet. In terms of picking the best crypto exchanges the centralized exchanges (Coinbase, Binance, Kraken & Gemini) are far more popular than decentralized ones as discussed in this Investopedia article. The latter also do not necessarily do better than their centralized counterparts in safety. According to this Wikipedia article, “(i)n July 2018, decentralized exchange Bancor was reportedly hacked and suffered a loss of $13.5M in assets before freezing funds.”

By the way, I have little doubt that Satoshi Nakamoto is the person’s real Japanese name because his words and deeds match the behavioral pattern under the influence of Confucianism.

While being modest and maintaining a low key in spite of great success is a virtue, I wish Nakamoto had some exposure to psychology to help him understand imposing constraints in access, control and architecture is itself a valuable incentive, while leaving everything open can be a big turnoff because it can significantly weaken the sense of individual responsibility.

China has a famous proverbial story that says a Buddhist temple was deeply hidden in the mountain and people had to go downhill to get drinking water. First there was just one monk in the temple, who always carried two buckets of water on his shoulder and climbed uphill. Life was hard but manageable. Later one more monk joined the temple, and the two decided they both should share the responsibility of getting one bucket of water uphill as nobody wanted to be the one carrying two buckets. Soon another monk came and since none of them wanted to be the “water carrier,” the three all died of thirst.

So the famous saying goes: One monk = 2 buckets of water, two monks = 1 bucket of water and three monks = 0 bucket of water (一个和尚挑水喝,两个和尚抬水喝,三个和尚没水喝).

In the Nakamoto’s case, according to this article published in August 2021, there were 12,130 public nodes running on the Bitcoin network. Such a global “temple of Nakamoto” is much larger than three “monks.”

But my intention is never to mock all free and open entities as the “temple of three monks.” Instead, I strongly believe temples of one, two or three monks should all be allowed to exist, at least to try out. Diversity makes life beautiful, while the same model of life never fits everyone.  

How Rule of Law Helps Protect Privacy

I have two counterarguments to weaken the equation of CBDC = Authoritarianism. First of all, not everything is to be changed by CBDC. At the end of day, customers own their transaction records and have the right to keep them private. Shifting from commercial banks to central bank (if the US decides on a “retail CBDC” model, see later for details) will not change that. The same laws and regulations should apply tomorrow as they do today. Following my thesis of “rule of law = surprises,” laws offer protection to the weaker, less resourceful agents, entities or parties. Just because someone has access to free information does not mean they are free to use it anyway they want.

Secondly, while CBDC may allow central banks easier access to transaction records than before, pending on which business CBDC model we choose to follow, one may argue that the risk exposure will be lower rather than higher today. With about 85,000 branch offices of commercial banks in the country according to this article in Harvard Business Review (HBR), all allowed to access or to hold customers’ transaction records, hacker attacks and information leaks are bound to happen. The same HBR article says that the “cost of fraud to U.S. financial services companies is estimated at 1.5% of revenues, or around $15 billion annually.” By handing over the records to the central bank (again pending on the retail CBDC model, which may not be the best) that is better equipped with security resources than commercial banks do, we expect fewer attacks, although each attack may be more devastating if it does happen, as the loss will be higher.

The moral of the story is that we hardly ever see decisions completely risk free. Far more likely we will face trade-offs that force us to weigh benefits and costs, to compare solutions and to arrive at the conditionally best choice.

Enough for philosophical talks and let us see which business model of CBDC will allow us to avoid or mitigate some costs and seek more benefits from transitions. Before doing that, however, we have to clear one more mental hurdle first.

A Little Patience Helps Everyone

The second problem with the “CBDC = Authoritarianism” equation is lack of patience to jump to conclusions too quickly, which reduces the possibility of keeping an open mind. This may not seem a big deal but lacking patience can be fatal for developing good, sensible and smooth agenda of changes.

The last time I checked, with China moving the fastest, not a single CBDC project on the face of the earth has been set in stone. We are seeing white papers, proof of concept and experimentations. There are just too many variables and too little certainty at this moment.

To begin, it is not even sure that all CBDC models will have the central bank getting all the retail transaction information. To be sure, some fintech experts, like Ajay S. Mookerjee in an HBR essay, seem to favor retail CBDC when he pictures “a scenario in which every citizen has, in essence, a checking account with the Central Bank” that makes “the central bank effectively becoming the sole intermediary for financial transactions” and “becomes the lender of first rather than last resort,” therefore eliminating all “bank runs” and the need for FDIC insurance as “the depositor carries no risk.”

The Three CBDC Business Models

I am not sure whether such a scenario will arrive anytime soon — if ever — with any degree of certainty. You do not have to listen to me but do listen to what banking experts have to say. In the 2021 BIS (Bank of International Settlement) report cited earlier, the authors summarized three CBDC models (in Graph III.7), although less informative and less insightful discussions can be found elsewhere by Ernst Young and McKinsey.

First we have “direct CBDC” or retail CBDC, in which the central bank is dealing with every individual customer, be it business or household, covering all operational tasks with user-facing activities like account opening, maintenance and enforcement of money laundering.

This is the least likely model that the Fed will follow. I know this because on Jan. 20, 2022, seven days before Strobel publishedheropinion in Newsweek, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) released a discussion paper on the pros and cons of creating a central bank digital currency (CBDC) for the United States. In the paper, which invites public comment through May 20, 2022, the FRB already makes it clear that the US CBDC “must be intermediated (the private sector, not the Fed, would offer accounts or digital wallets to facilitate the management of CBDC holdings and payments).” The reason: Such a model would ignore or bypass all the intermediaries of commercial banks and other fintech players, who are better equipped to deal with retail customers than the central bank does.

Direct CBDC model also means the central banks will act like Strobel has claimed as a “money printer” (i.e., regulating monetary policy) and “personal banker” at the same time, which is not a smart idea — not for ideological reasons but for efficiency considerations. But if one must look at the issue from a pure ideological lens, something Strobel is clearly doing, I would say direct CBDC model smells more like authoritarianism than the wholesale model does, as the former inevitably leads to a much deeper penetration of citizens’ financial lives than the latter does.

The second model is what BIS calls “hybrid” CBDC architecture, in which the private sector “onboards all clients, is responsible for enforcing AML/CFT (i.e., anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing)regulations and ongoing due diligence and conducts all retail payments in real time. However, the central bank also records retail balances.” According to BIS, “The e-CNY, the CBDC issued by the People’s Bank of China and currently in a trial phase, exemplifies such a hybrid design.” As I quoted above, it looks like the FRB will also be on board, as well as the European Central Bank (ECB).

With such a model, existing financial institutions like banks and other financial or fintech entities will be handling customers’ digital accounts. Although CBDC is the sole liability of central bank — just like hard cash is — operationally the private sector is not “off the hook” from the CBDC liability. In case when hackers attack, separating customers into different financial institutions makes the risk containable at local level. One may even say that this model is resonant with the decentralized and defused blockchain technology, despite the debate on whether permissioned (or private) blockchains, with which CBDC fits better than with public or permissionless blockchains, can be counted as genuine blockchain (I believe they should, see more later).

The last model discussed by BIS is the “intermediated” CBDC, which has been more commonly referred to as the “wholesale CBDC.” As the name implies, wholesale CBDC limits interactions of central bank to financial institutions, where central banks will run a wholesale ledger, although “PSPs (Payment Service Providers) would need to be closely supervised to ensure at all times that the wholesale holdings they communicate to the central bank indeed add up to the sum of all retail accounts.

A recent (undated) report by Ernest Young (EY) entitled “Crypto Assets the Global Regulation Perspective” (in downloadable PDF) also points out that the wholesale (i.e., with intermediation) model leverages existing (private) financial institutions to make CBDC like a central bank reserve account, “leaving a considerable role for existing market participants, such as banks and payments providers, avoiding the risk of disintermediation, and alleviating central banks from operational tasks such as customer due diligence (CDD) procedures.”

BIS is in favor of the hybrid model and urges CBDC to avoid a large footprint in retail and consumer facing financial activities, and instead to allow financial intermediaries to do what they do best: “CBDCs are best designed as part of a two-tier system, where the central bank and the private sector each play their respective role. A logical step in their design is to delegate the majority of operational tasks and consumer facing activities to commercial banks and non-bank PSPs that provide retail services on a competitive level playing field.”

This is the conclusion I like. Of the three models, direct (aka, retail) CBDC marks the largest deviation from the current central bank functionalities, while the wholesale model is likely to produce the least amount of changes from the current role of central banks. The hybrid model sits in between the two.

Privacy Has Not Been Forgotten

The BIS 2021 report has a separate section on how to identify and safeguard privacy of customers. It compares two models of the “token-based” versus “account-based.” BIS concludes that “a token-based CBDC which comes with full anonymity could facilitate illegal activity and is therefore unlikely to serve the public interest.” Instead, “Identification at some level is hence central in the design of CBDCs. This calls for a CBDC that is account-based and ultimately tied to a digital identity, but with safeguards on data privacy as additional features.”

It is not particularly hard to sell the idea of account based model, given the current system all demand for establishing accounts. The key challenge is how to balance digital money safety and privacy. The former is essentially about public safety like cyberattacks, money laundering and financial theft, while the latter about individual safety like identity theft, data abuse or even personal safety. “Consequently, it is most useful to implement anonymity with respect to specific parties, such as PSPs, businesses or public agencies. CBDC designs can allow for privacy by separating payment services from control over the resulting data.” “CBDCs could give users control over their payments data, which they need only share with PSPs or third parties as they decide.

In other words, just because CBDC is issued by the central bank does not mean the latter has automatic access to transactions information involving CBDC. This is not much different from hard cash, which is also issued by central bank and yet the latter has only limited knowledge of how every dollar is paid by whom to whom, unless it involves a hefty sum of cash.

Every party, other than the owner of the data, including government agencies, should only have access to transaction information at a “need to know” basis, nobody possesses automatic and sweeping rights. That way, the users maintain their data right and ownership, everyone else would take access as a privilege rather than as a right.

My Grand View of CBDC

I am not as “left leaning” as Satoshi Nakamoto is and I prefer not to discuss decisions or choices based on value judgements alone. I also do not see the need of treating governments as inevitably public enemies. They are just human created institutions with strengths and weaknesses like all of us do.

Although I do not judge others by the values they hold, I do hold my own value preference or value proposal. I care most about two things: Institutional inclusiveness and transitional efficiency. I call for the most preferred — also the least costly — scenario to emerge at the end of the transition period, in which central banks and decentralized cryptocurrencies will stay together rather than to kill or defeat each other. Given that, as pointed out by BIS, CBDC offers the unique advantages of “settlement finality, liquidity and integrity” for the digital economy, I entitled this post “CBDC by All Means.”

When a new innovation emerges from the horizon, we have always seen fans so enthusiastic that they predict the new innovation will wipe out or obsolete the old ones. History frequently proved them wrong because it takes time and trial-and-error for society to become aware, enticed, learn and eventually accept the new and drop down the old ones. This is a tall order and sometimes we may have to rely on the nature to get the job done. For example, we may have to wait until the entire old generation passed away to completely obsolete the land line phones.

History has also shown repeatedly that institutional inclusiveness pays. Humans are better off by having both centralized and decentralized controls, both open and limited accesses, both concentrated and distributed power /information structure.

These three dimensions — control, access & architecture — are discussed by this academic article, to which I want to add two more: Humans need both trusted and trust-free exchanges and we also need both disintermediated and intermediated transactions. I know some Bitcoin supporters strongly prefer disintermediation of anything, but the truth is that we often end up replacing one intermediary by another. Coinbase is a good example. Cryptocurrency traders do get rid of the traditional banks, but they pick up Coinbase or other (centralized) exchanges.

Will Central Bank Have Total Control of All Transactions?

To see why the US CBDC will not “give the government total control and oversight over every person’s holdings and transactions” like Strobel claims, let us first see what the Fed had said. On Jan. 20, 2022, seven days before Strobel publishedheropinion in Newsweek, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) released a discussion paper on the pros and cons of creating a central bank digital currency (CBDC) for the United States. In the paper, which invites public comment through May 20, 2022, the Fed specifically notes that if a U.S. CBDC is created, it should “(c)omplement, rather than replace, current forms of money and methods for providing financial services.”

In other words, it is not in Fed’s plan to wipe out traditional forms of fiat money and to replace it with CBDC. This means even if every CBDC dollar is used for the evil “authoritarian” purposes, the Fed cannot gain “total control and oversight over every person’s holdings and transactions” like Strobel said, because traditional forms of fiat money will continue to exist — unless one regards all government issued money as authoritarian tokens.

If the goal is to gain the best control of all transactions, the Fed is better off replacing current forms of money by CBDC. This is because transactions using hard cash are still harder to be tracked than digital money. Drug dealers and money launderers often transact by paying cash, as recently reported by a credible study of SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), rather than paying crypto.

The fact that the Fed is not pushing for complete replacement of cash by CBDC means it has something else in mind. Perhaps reducing the shock of radical transition or waiting for the blockchain technology to become more mature? It is safe to say there are multiple considerations in which controlling for transactions is just one of them.

What If All Fiat Money Is Gone?

But let’s stop guessing what is on Fed’s mind and simply assume Fed wants to replace all traditional forms of fiat money in the future. Furthermore, let’s also assume all governments want the same thing: controlling and overseeing everyone’s transactions. Now, with these assumptions will CBDC help the Fed achieve that goal?

The answer has to be “No!” In order to control all transactions, it is insufficient to make CBDC the only form of fiat money. We already know the reason: Even if the Fed makes CBDC a legal tender (i.e., the money that is legally established as satisfactory payment), which is certainly in the plan if the Fed decides to go with CBDC, CBDC will not be the only digital currency available in the market to cover all transactions. Other cryptocurrencies are already there. The only way for CBDC to have full control is to wipe out, or to drive out of circulation, all cryptocurrencies not issued by central banks. This would bring us back to the old days when Fed issued fiat money is the only currency available for all transactions in the market.

CBDC & Monopoly Power of Central Banks

How likely is it for the Fed to eliminate all cryptocurrencies so that its CBDC will be only legal tender and used exclusively for all transactions by all people? It is extremely unlikely. The reason is not because of the love affair between central banks and cryptocurrencies. If you know the history of Bitcoin, you should know that Satoshi Nakamoto created Bitcoin not to pave the way for CBDC to come later but exactly the opposite: to win a major battle in the arms race with government. Nakamoto was not shy in saying it out loudly why he wanted a decentralized currency: “Governments are good at cutting off the heads of a centrally controlled networks like Napster, but pure P2P networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to be holding their own.”

We now know the story after Nakamoto said that: Blockchains and cryptocurrencies have won a battle with the government — more generally with the central control of currencies. The fact that the Fed is talking about CBDC is a sure sign of that victory. It is like the old saying: If you can’t beat them, join them, which is what the Fed said it may do next.

Given this scenario, it is clear that CBDC will have to learn to co-exist with other crypto that emerged before it. This Investopedia article even asks about the possibility for cryptocurrencies to dismantle the central bank. Although that is unlikely, nor beneficial, to happen, it is clear that the crypto has dismantled the monopoly power of the central banks (see more on this later), not the bank itself. To break up or to end a monopoly all it takes is for a single unit of non-Fed issued cryptocurrency, be it Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum or Dogecoin, to legally exists in the market. This is exactly what we are seeing today. In California, it is even proposed to make the cryptocurrency a legal tender, meaning it will be — if passed as law — perfectly legal to pay workers, consumers or citizens with cryptocurrency.

To governments’ ears the existence of even one unit of cryptocurrency is like a loud crack of thunder, which explains why so many people are talking about how monetary policies would be impacted in the future.

Debate on Permissioned Blockchain

The only weakness of the 2021 BIS report is that it barely touched on the technical issues involved in blockchain. There is an ongoing debate on whether permissioned (i.e., private) blockchains should be counted as a genuine blockchains. This is directly relevant to CBDC, which is more likely to sit in a private blockchain. A private blockchain is still a “distributed secure database,” which is the nature of all blockchains. If both central bank and commercial banks following the hybrid, two-tier architecture maintain databases of their own on CBDC related transactions, they would form a distributed ledger.

Even limited redundancy, meaning a few entities keeping repeated and redundant ledgers of the same transactions, is better than a single centralized ledger. The Fed could form an alliance with centralized cryptocurrency exchanges (the most successful ones like Coinbase, Binance, Kraken, and Gemini), that would boost up security. Say the Fed asks Coinbase to accept and to deposit CBDC for citizens, and both Fed and Coinbase keep separate ledgers for these customers, that would be a good idea, given these exchanges’ more experience with digital money than ordinary banks. 

Permissioned blockchain like this will not be open to everyone in the society but can still implement the key security features commonly seen in a blockchain, like the hash function (more strictly cryptocurrency hash function), Merkle tree, digital signatures (public and private keys), Proof of Work (PoW) and the longest chain protocol. Ultimately it is up to the alliance to try and to decide how far into the existing blockchain technology is the best for them.

A more interesting discussion is in this lecture note from Stanford University, where the instructor talks about how we can have the best of two worlds: Nakamoto + BFT (Byzantine Fault Tolerance). The latter is like CBDC to allow a permissioned system of static participation, unlike Bitcoin as a permissionless system of dynamic participation. Again, this means institutional inclusiveness wins over exclusiveness.

The US History of Money

I thought I had said all the things I wanted to say but thanks to this Investopedia article and also this lecture note, I learned an important fact that money is not always the way we know it today. Before the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, came into the scene, “(m)oney issued by non-bank entities like merchants and municipal corporations proliferated throughout the U.S. monetary system. The exchange rates for each of these currencies varied, and many were frauds, not backed by enough gold reserves to justify their valuations. Bank runs and panics periodically convulsed through the U.S. economy.”

The US emerged successfully from those chaotic — but little known or long forgotten — days and came up with a central bank system. “Immediately after the Civil War, the National Currency Act of 1863 and the National Bank Act of 1864 helped set the grounding for a centralized and federal system of money.A uniform national banknote that was redeemable at face value in commercial centers across the country was issued. Further to this, the Federal Reserve’s creation in 1913 brought monetary and financial stability to the economy.”

This story reminds me of the words from one of the most famous novels in China: Stories of the Three Kingdoms (三国演义). The author summarized Chinese history with a tendance to see people uniting after a long period of fighting, and fighting after a long period of uniting (天下大势,分久必合,合久必分). Translating this line of thinking to the history of US currency, we may say the money started from being decentralized to centralized and now is poised to go back to decentralization, thanks to the co-existence of crypto, CBDC and blockchains.